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Abstract
In many economic and social contexts, individual players choose their partners and also
decide on a mode of behavior in interactions with these partners. This paper develops a
simple model to examine the interaction between partner choice and individual behavior
in games of coordination. An important ingredient of our approach is the way we model
partner choice: we suppose that a player can establish ties with other players by investing
in costly pair-wise links.
We show that individual eorts to balance the costs and benets of links sharply restrict
the range of stable interaction architectures; equilibrium networks are either complete or
have the star architecture. Moreover, the process of network formation has powerful eects
on individual behavior: if costs of forming links are low then players coordinate on the
risk-dominant action, while if costs of forming links are high then they coordinate on the
eÆcient action.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, several authors have examined the role of interaction structure { dierent
terms like network structure, neighborhood inuences, and peer group pressures, have been
used { in explaining a wide range of social and economic phenomena. This includes work
on social learning and adoption of new technologies, evolution of conventions, collective
action, labor markets, and nancial fragility.
1
The research suggests that the structure of
interaction can be decisive in determining the nature of outcomes. This leads us to examine
the reasonableness/robustness of dierent structures and is the primary motivation for
developing a model in which the evolution of the interaction structure is itself an object of
study.
We propose a general approach to study this question. We suppose that individual entities
can undertake a transaction only if they are `linked'. This link may refer to a social or
a business relationship, or it may refer simply to awareness of the others. We take the
view that links are costly, in the sense that it takes eort and resources to create and
maintain them. This leads us to study the incentives of individuals to form links and the
implications of this link formation for aggregate outcomes.
In the present paper, we apply this approach to a particular problem: the inuence of
link formation on individual behavior in games of coordination.
2
There is a group of
players, who have the opportunity to play a 2  2 coordination game with each other.
Two players can only play with one another if they are `linked' to each other. These links
can be made on individual initiative but are costly to form. So each player prefers that
others incur the cost and form links with him. The payos of the coordination game are
assumed positive and individuals care about aggregate payos. Therefore, they always
accept any link supported (i.e. paid) by some other player. The link decisions of dierent
players dene a network of social interaction. In addition to the choice of links, each player
has to choose an action that she will use in all the games that she will engage in. We
are interested in the nature of networks that emerge and the eects of link formation on
social coordination. In our setting, links as well as actions in the coordination game are
1
See e.g., Allen and Gale (1998), Bala and Goyal (1998), Chwe (1996), Coleman (1966), Ellison and
Fudenberg (1993), Ellison (1993), Granovetter (1974), Haag and Laguno (1999), and Morris (2000),
among others.
2
Many games of interest have multiple equilibria. The study of equilibrium selection (which manifests
itself most sharply in coordination games) therefore occupies a central place in game theory. We discuss
the contribution of our paper to this research in greater detail below.
2
chosen by individuals on an independent basis. This allows us to study the social process
as a population-wide non-cooperative game. Moreover, allowing for links to be formed
on an independent basis allows us to distinguish between active and passive links.
3
This
distinction plays an important role in our analysis.
We start with a consideration of the situation in which two players can only play a game if
they have a direct link between them. We nd that a variety of networks { including the
complete network, the empty network and partially connected networks { can be supported
in equilibria of the static game. Moreover, the society can coordinate on dierent actions
and conformism as well as diversity with regard to actions of individuals is possible in
Nash equilibrium. This multiplicity motivates an examination of the dynamic stability of
dierent outcomes.
We develop a dynamic model in which, at regular intervals, individuals choose links and
actions to maximize their payos. Occasionally they make errors or experiment. Our
interest is in the nature of long run outcomes, when the probability of these errors is small.
We nd that the stochastic dynamics generate clear-cut predictions both concerning the
architecture of networks as well as regarding the nature of social coordination.
In particular, we show that the complete network is the unique stochastically stable ar-
chitecture (except for the case where costs of link formation are very high and the empty
network results).
4
Figure 1a gives an example of a complete network in a society with 4
players. This result shows that partially connected networks are not stable. We also nd
that, if players are at all connected, they always coordinate in the long run on the same
action, i.e. social conformism obtains. However, the nature of coordination depends on
the costs of link formation. If the costs of link formation are low, players coordinate on
the risk-dominant action, while for high costs of link formation they coordinate on the
eÆcient action (Theorem 3.1). Thus our analysis reveals that, even though the eventual
network is the same in all cases of interest, the process of network formation itself has
serious implications for the nature of social coordination.
3
Consider two players i and j and suppose player i forms a (costly) link with player j. Such a link is
an active link for player i while it is a passive link for player j.
4
In a complete network, every pair of players is directly linked, while in a empty network there are no
links.
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Figure 1b
Center-sponsored Star
The above result says that equilibrium networks are complete or empty. In practice, a
variety of factors will lead to incomplete networks; these include capacity constraints on
the time and budget of individual players, increasing marginal costs to forming links, and it
is also likely that indirect connections will facilitate transactions making complete networks
unnecessary. In the present paper we explore the latter possibility, i.e. we investigate the
role of indirect linkages between players that facilitate transactions. As before, our focus is
on the architecture of stable networks and the inuence of link formation on the behavior
of players in the games with linked players.
Specically, we consider a model in which two players can play a game if they are directly
or indirectly linked with each other.
5
In this setting, we nd that the center-sponsored
star is the unique stochastically stable architecture. This is a network in which a single
player forms a link with every other player and pays for all the links. Figure 1b provides
an example of this architecture for a society with 4 players. We also nd that there exists
a critical cost of forming links, such that, for costs below this level, players coordinate on
the risk-dominant action, while for costs above this level, they coordinate on the eÆcient
action (Theorem 4.1).
To summarize: we examine a model in which players choose their partners { by forming
costly pairwise links { and choose as well an action in the coordination games played
with these partners. Individual eorts to balance the costs and benets of forming links
generate, over time, simple network architectures { the complete network in one case and
the star in the other. However, the nature of individual behavior in the coordination games
is sensitive to the cost of forming links and this relationship is robust across the settings
we examine: players choose the risk-dominant action for low costs of forming links but the
5
More precisely, two players can play a game with each other if there is a path between them in the
social network.
4
eÆcient action for high costs. The proofs of our theorems on stochastically stable states
use the same general approach. We now sketch this approach briey.
Suppose that the cost of forming links is such that both types of coordination outcomes,
the eÆcient one as well as the ineÆcient (risk-dominant) one can be sustained in a social
equilibrium. We study the stochastic stability of the two kinds of outcomes: a com-
plete network with eÆcient coordination and a complete network with ineÆcient (but
risk-dominant) coordination. Roughly speaking, we need to assess the minimum number
of \mutations" required to exit from each state. Suppose that we are in the state where
everyone is choosing the ineÆcient action. We assess the minimum number of mutations
needed to exit from this state as follows. Given a particular network structure a certain
minimum of players must be choosing the eÆcient action for a player to prefer to play
this action. The rst step is to nd a lower bound on the number of such players needed,
across the set of all possible networks. This step also derives the network architecture that
facilitates the transition. Then, the second step shows that the lower bound on mutations
computed in the rst step is indeed suÆcient for transition from the particular networks
that obtain in equilibrium.
We now develop some intuition for the nature of the network that yields this minimum
number of mutations. Here for the sake of concreteness, we focus on the case of direct
links. In our model, links are one-sided and this makes them a public good. An action  is
particularly attractive for player i when every player choosing  forms a link with i, while
no player choosing the alternative action  forms any links with i. In such a situation, if
player i were to choose  then she would have to form a link with every player choosing
the same action, while if she chooses action  then she can count on `free-riding' on the
links that the others have created.
Number the players from 1 to n. Suppose that a player i forms a link with every other
player with a higher index. This generates a complete network. Now suppose that the rst
k players have their strategies `mutate', and they all switch from the ineÆcient action ()
to the eÆcient action (). Now consider the situation of player k+1. This player is exactly
in the situation described above. If the costs of forming links are very small, then player
k + 1 will choose to connect with everyone, irrespective of the choice of actions. Thus
the free-riding aspect is relatively unimportant; the network is complete for all practical
purposes and standard risk-dominance considerations prevail if cost of forming links is
5
small. Next suppose that costs are relatively high in the sense that player k + 1 forms a
link with players k + 2; ::; n only if she chooses action , i.e. the costs of forming links are
higher than the miscoordination payo. In this case, the structure of the network becomes
important and we show that, even with relatively few mutants (i.e. the rst players k
choosing the eÆcient action), the `passive' links player k + 1 enjoys to them makes it
attractive for this player (and then all others with higher index) to switch to action .
This in turn leads to the eÆcient coordination outcome being stochastically stable when
costs of forming links are relatively high.
The above considerations suggest that, even among complete networks, there are very sig-
nicant dierences in the relative mutation-responsiveness of each of them, i.e. there can
be substantial dierences in the minimum mutation threshold required for a global transi-
tion to occur. We observe, in particular, that a highly asymmetric pattern of connections
should generally enhance the mutation fragility of equilibrium congurations. This is why
such asymmetric networks play a crucial role in facilitating those transitions that alter the
nature of social coordination, e.g. the transition from an ineÆcient to an eÆcient state.
6
We now place the paper and the results in context. Traditionally, sociologists have held
the view that individual actions, and in turn aggregate outcomes, are in large part deter-
mined by interaction structure. By contrast, economists have tended to focus on markets,
where social ties and the specic features of the interaction structures between agents are
typically not important. In recent years, economists have examined in greater detail the
role of interaction structure and found that it plays an important role in shaping important
economic phenomena (see the references given above, and also Granovetter, 1985). This
has led to a study of the processes through which the structure emerges. The present paper
is part of this general research program.
Next, we relate the paper to work in economics. The paper contributes to two research
areas: network formation games and equilibrium selection/coordination problems. We
suppose that individual players can form pair-wise links by incurring some costs, at their
6
This observation is reminiscent of recent work conducted by Albert, Jeong, and Barabasi (2000) on
the error and attack tolerance displayed by dierent network arrangements. Specically, these authors
show that the inhomogenous connectivity of many complex networks (e.g. the World-Wide Web, where
some nodes bear many links whereas most others only have a few) makes them rather fragile to targeted
attack although very tolerant to unguided error. In our case, where mutation probabilities are conceived
as very small, the \attack fragility" is the dominant consideration that lends to inhomogeneous networks
their key role in the analysis.
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own initiative, i.e. link formation is one-sided. This allows us to model the network
formation process as a non-cooperative game. This element of our model is similar to the
work of Bala and Goyal (2000), from which we borrow some of the techniques applied
in the indirect-link scenario. Related work on network formation includes Dutta, van den
Nouweland and Tijs (1995) and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). This earlier work focuses on
the architectural and the welfare properties of strategically stable networks, in a context
where the sole concern of players is whom they connect to. In contrast, the primary
contribution of the present paper is the presentation of a common framework in which
the emergence of interaction networks and the behaviour of linked players can be jointly
studied, both under direct and indirect links.
7
In many games of interest, multiple equilibria arise naturally and so the problem of equi-
librium selection occupies a central place in the theory of games. In recent years, there has
been a considerable amount of research on equilibrium selection/coordination;
8
An impor-
tant nding of this work is that interaction structure and the mobility of players matters
and that, by varying the structure, the rate of change as well as the long run outcome can
be signicantly altered.
9
It is therefore worthwhile to examine the circumstances under
which dierent network structures emerge. From a theoretical point of view, a natural way
to do this is by examining the strategic stability of dierent interaction structures. This is
the route taken in the present paper.
A well known result on equilibrium selection in the learning and evolution literature is
that risk-dominance considerations prevail over those of eÆciency and, if there is a conict
between these two considerations, an ineÆcient but risk-dominant equilibrium can be stable
in the long run. This nding have been re-examined by several authors and the result has
been shown to be sensitive to dierent assumptions, such as the nature of the strategy
7
In independent work, Droste, Gilles and Johnson (1999), and Jackson and Watts (1999) have developed
a related model which addresses similar concerns. The primary dierence between these papers and ours
pertains to the model of link formation: the former consider two-sided link formation while we study
one-sided link formation. Moreover, we allow for direct as well as indirect connections, while those papers
consider only direct connections. These dierences have a signicant impact on the conclusions. We further
discuss these papers in the conclusion.
8
One strand of this work considers dynamic models. This work includes Blume (1993), Canning (1992),
Ellison (1993), Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), and Young (1993), among others.
For a consideration of this same equilibrium selection problem from a dierent (\eductive") perspective,
the reader may refer to the work of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) or the more recent paper by Carlson and
van Damme (1993).
9
See, for example, Ellison (1993), Goyal (1996) and Morris (2000), among others.
7
revision rule, precise modeling of mutation, and mobility of players across locations.
10
The
results in our paper are closely related to the work on mobility.
The basic insight of the work on player mobility is that if individuals can separate/insulate
themselves easily from those who are playing an ineÆcient action (e.g., the risk-dominant
action), then eÆcient \enclaves" will be readily formed and eventually attract the \mi-
gration" of others (who will therefore turn to playing eÆciently). In a rough sense, one
may be inclined to establish a parallelism between easy mobility and low costs of forming
links. However, the considerations involved in each case turn out to be very dierent, as is
evident from the sharp contrast between our conclusions (recall the above summary) and
those of the mobility literature.
There are two main reasons for this contrast. First, in our case, players do not indirectly
choose their pattern of interaction with others by moving across a pre-specied network of
locations (as in the case of player mobility). Rather, they construct directly their interaction
network (with no exogenous restrictions) by choosing those agents with whom they want
to play the game. Second, the cost of link formation (which are paid per link formed)
act as a screening device that is truly eective only if it is high enough. In a heuristic
sense, we may say that it is precisely the restricted \mobility" these costs induce which
helps insulate (and thus protect) the individuals who are choosing the eÆcient action. If
the link-formation costs are too low, the extensive interaction they facilitate may have the
unfortunate consequence of rendering risk-dominance considerations decisive.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the framework. Section
3 presents the results for the case of direct links, while Section 4 studies the case where
players can play a game if they are either directly or indirectly connected to each other.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Networks
Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be a set of players, where n  3. We are interested in modelling
a situation where each of these players can choose the subset of other players with whom
10
See e.g., Bergin and Lipman (1996), Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996), Ely (1996), Mailath, Samuelson
and Shaked (1994), Oechssler (1997), or Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (1998), among others.
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to play a xed bilateral game. Formally, let g
i
= (g
i1
; : : : g
i;i 1
; g
i;i+1
; : : : g
in
) be the set of
links formed by player i. We suppose that g
ij
2 f1; 0g, and say that player i forms a link
with player j if g
ij
= 1. The set of link options is denoted by G
i
. Any player prole of link
decisions g = (g
1
; g
2
: : : g
n
) denes a directed graph, called a network. Abusing notation,
the network will also be denoted by g:
Specically, the network g has the set of players N as its set of vertices while its set of
arrows,    N  N; is dened as follows:   = f(i; j) 2 N  N : g
ij
= 1g. Graphically,
the link (i; j) may be represented as an edge between i and j, a lled circle lying on the
edge near agent i indicating that this agent has formed (or supports) that link. Every
link prole g 2 G has a unique representation in this manner. Figure 1 below depicts an
example. In it, player 1 has formed links with players 2 and 3, player 3 has formed a link
with player 1, while player 2 has formed no links.
11
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Figure 1
Given a network g; we say that a pair of players i and j are directly linked if at least one of
them has established a linked with the other one, i.e. if maxfg
ij
; g
ji
g = 1. To describe the
pattern of players' links, it is useful to dene a modied version of g, denoted by g, that is
dened as follows: g
ij
= maxfg
ij
; g
ji
g for each i and j in N . Note that g
ij
= g
ji
so that the
index order is irrelevant. We refer to g
ij
as an active link for player i and a passive link for
player j. We say there is a path in g between i and j if either g
ij
= 1 or there exist agents
j
1
,: : :,j
m
distinct from each other and i and j such that g
i;j
1
=    = g
j
k
;j
k+1
=    g
j
m
;j
= 1.
We write i
g
 ! j to indicate that there is a path between players i and j in network g.
Let N
d
(i; g)  fj 2 N : g
ij
= 1g be the set of players in network g with whom player i has
established links, while 
d
(i; g)  jN
d
(i; g)j is its cardinality. Similarly, let N
d
(i; g)  fj 2
N : g
ij
= 1g be the set of players in network g with whom player i is directly linked, while

d
(i; g)  jN
d
(i; g)j is the cardinality of this set. Let N(i; g)  fj 2 N : i
g
 ! jg be the
players with whom player i has a path (is directly or indirectly linked) in a network g; we
also dene (i; g)  jN(i; g)j to be the cardinality of this set.
11
Since agents choose strategies independently of each other, two agents may simultaneously initiate a
two-way link, as seen in the gure.
9
A sub-graph g
0
 g is called a component of g if for all i; j 2 g
0
, i 6= j, there exists a path
in g
0
connecting i and j, and for all i 2 g
0
and j 2 g, g
ij
= 1 implies g
0
ij
= 1. A network
with only one component is called connected. Given any g; the notation g+ ij will denote
the network obtained by replacing g
ij
in network g by 1. Similarly, g   ij will refer to
the network obtained by replacing g
ij
in network g by 0. A connected network g is said
to be minimally connected if the network obtained by deleting any single link, g   ij, is
not connected. A special example of minimally connected network is the center-sponsored
star: a network g is called a center-sponsored star if there exists some i 2 N such that, for
all j 2 Nnfig; g
ij
= 1, and for all j; k 2 Nnfig; j 6= k; g
jk
= 0.
2.2 Social Game
Individuals located in a social network play a 2  2 symmetric game in strategic form
with common action set. The set of partners of player i depends on her location in the
network. We shall consider two dierent models: in the rst model we will assume that
two individuals can play a game if and only if they have a direct link between them. In
this case, player i will play a game with all other players in the set N
d
(i; g). In the second
model a player can play a game with all other players with whom she is directly or indirectly
linked. In this case, player i will play a game with the players in the set N(i; g).
We now describe the bilateral game that is played between any two partners. The set of
actions is A = f; g: For each pair of actions a; a
0
2 A; the payo (a; a
0
) earned by a
player choosing a when the partner plays a
0
is given by the following table:
2
1
 
 d e
 f b
Table I
We shall assume that the game is one of coordination with two pure strategy equilibria,
(; ) and ; ). Without loss of generality we will assume that the (; ) equilibrium is
the eÆcient one. Finally, in order to focus on the interesting case, we will assume that there
10
is a conict between eÆciency and risk-dominance. These considerations are summarized
in the following restrictions on the payos.
12
d > f ; b > e; d > b; d+ e < b + f: (1)
An important feature of our approach is that links are costly. Specically, every agent who
establishes a link with some other player incurs a cost c > 0. Thus, we suppose that the
cost of forming each link is independent of the number of links being established and is
the same across all players.
Another important feature of our model is that links are one-sided. This aspect of the
model allows us to use standard solution concepts from non-cooperative game theory in
addressing the issue of link formation. We shall assume that the payos in the bilateral
game are all positive and, therefore, no player has any incentive to refuse links initiated
by other players.
13
Every player i is obliged to choose the same action in the (possibly) several bilateral games
that she is engaged in. This assumption is natural in the present context: if players were
allowed to choose a dierent action for every two-person game they are involved in, this
would make the behaviour of players in any particular game insensitive to the network
structure. Thus, combining the former considerations, the strategy space of a player can
be identied with S
i
= G
i
A; where G
i
is the set of possible link decisions by i and A is
the common action space of the underlying bilateral game.
14
12
Our results extend in a natural way in case the risk-dominant equilibrium is also eÆcient, i.e., if
d + e > b+ f . In particular, the network is either complete or a star (depending on the nature of links),
while players coordinate on the (; ) equilibrium, which is risk-dominant as well as eÆcient, in the long
run.
13
There are dierent ways in which the assumption of positive payos in the coordination game can be
relaxed. One route is to dispense with any restriction on payos but suppose that, when player i supports
a link to player j; the payo (which may be negative) ows only to i. This formulation may be interpreted
as a model of peer groups and fashion, where asymmetric ow of inuence seems a natural feature. We
have analyzed this model and we nd that the relationship between link costs and equilibrium (both on
networks and actions) is similar to the one obtained in Theorem 3.1. The only dierence pertains to the
value of the cut-o value of the cost of forming links identied in the the theorem.
Another possible route to tackle possibly negative payos would be to maintain the bi-directional nature
of the game but give players the option to refuse the links initiated by others. This would lead to a model
with two-sided links which lies outside the scope of the present paper and requires dierent methods of
analysis.
14
In our formulation, players choose links and actions in the coordination game at the same time. An
alternative formulation would be to have players choose links rst and then choose actions, contingent on
the nature of the network observed. We discuss the timing of moves in the concluding remarks.
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We can now present the payos of the social game. First, we present the payo for the case
where only directly linked players can play with each other. Given the strategies of other
players, s
 i
= (s
1
; : : : s
i 1
; s
i+1
; : : : s
n
), the payo to a player i from playing some strategy
s
i
= (g
i
; a
i
) is given by:

i
(s
i
; s
 i
) =
X
j2N
d
(i;g)
(a
i
; a
j
)  
d
(i; g)  c (2)
We note that the individual payos are aggregated across the games played by him. In much
of earlier work, e.g. Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) or Ellison (1993), the distinction
between average or total payos was irrelevant since the size of the neighborhood was
given. Here, however, where the number of games an agent plays is endogenous, we want
to explicitly account for the inuence of the size of the neighborhood and thus choose the
aggregate-payo formulation.
Second, we present the payos for the case where two players can play a game if they have
a path between them. Given the strategies of other players, s
 i
= (s
1
; : : : s
i 1
; s
i+1
; : : : s
n
),
the payo to a player i from playing some strategy s
i
= (g
i
; a
i
) is then given by:
^

i
(s
i
; s
 i
) =
X
j2N(i;g)
(a
i
; a
j
)  
d
(i; g)  c (3)
These payo expressions allow us to particularize the standard notion of Nash Equilibrium
to each of the two alternative scenarios. Thus, for the model with direct links, a strategy
prole s

= (s

1
; : : : s

n
) is said to be a Nash equilibrium if, for all i 2 N;

i
(s

i
; s

 i
)  
i
(s
i
; s

 i
); 8s
i
2 S
i
: (4)
Similarly, we arrive at the notion of Nash Equilibrium for the indirect-link model by sub-
stituting
^
(:) for (:) in the above expression. On the other hand, a Nash equilibrium
in either scenario will be called strict if every player gets a strictly higher payo with her
current strategy than she would with any other strategy. The set of Nash equilibria will
be denoted by S

and that of strict Nash equilibria by S

:
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2.3 Dynamics
Time is modeled discretely, t = 1; 2; 3; : : :. At each t, the state of the system is given
by the strategy prole s(t)  [(g
i
(t); a
i
(t))]
n
i=1
specifying the action played, and links
established, by each player i 2 N: At every period t, there is a positive independent
probability p 2 (0; 1) that any given individual gets a chance to revise her strategy.
15
If
she receives this opportunity, we assume that she selects a new strategy
s
i
(t) 2 argmax
s
i
2S
i

i
(s
i
; s
 i
(t  1)): (5)
That is, she selects a best response to what other players chose in the preceding period.
16
If there are several strategies that fulll (5), then any one of them is taken to be selected
with, say, equal probability. This strategy revision process denes a simple Markov chain
on S  S
1
 :::S
n
: In our setting, which will be seen to display multiple strict equilibria,
there are several absorbing states of the Markov chain.
17
This motivates the examination
of the relative robustness of each of them.
To do so, we rely on the approach proposed by Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), and
Young (1993). We suppose that, occasionally, players make mistakes, experiment, or simply
disregard payo considerations in choosing their strategies. Specically, we assume that,
conditional on receiving a revision opportunity, a player chooses her strategy at random
with some small \mutation" probability  > 0. For any  > 0, the process denes a Markov
chain that is aperiodic and irreducible and, therefore, has a unique invariant probability
distribution. Let us denote this distribution by 

. We analyze the form of 

as the
probability of mistakes becomes very small, i.e. formally, as  converges to zero. Dene
lim
!0


= ^. When a state s = (s
1
; s
2
; : : : ; s
n
) has ^(s) > 0, i.e. it is in the support
of ^, we say that it is stochastically stable. Intuitively, this reects the idea that, even
for innitesimal mutation probability (and independently of initial conditions), this state
materializes a signicant fraction of time in the long run.
15
This formulation may be interpreted as saying that, with some positive probability, a player dies and
is replaced by another player.
16
We are implicitly assuming that players have complete information the network structure as well as
the prole of actions. This assumption simplies the strategy choice signicantly in a setting where a
player can potentially play with everyone else in the society.
17
We note that the set of absorbing states of the Markov chain coincides with the set of strict Nash
equilibria of the one-shot game.
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3 Direct Links
This section provides an analysis of the model in which two players can undertake a transac-
tion only if they have a direct link between them. We rst characterize the Nash equilibrium
of the social game. We then provide a complete characterization of the set of stochastically
stable social outcomes.
3.1 Equilibrium outcomes
Our rst result concerns the nature of networks that arise in equilibria. If costs of link
formation are low (c < e), then a player has an incentive to link up with other players
irrespective of the actions the other players are choosing. On the other hand, when costs
are quite high (specically, b < c < d) then everyone who is linked must be choosing the
eÆcient action. This, however, implies that it is attractive to form a link with every other
player and we get the complete network again. Thus, for relatively low and high costs, we
should expect to see the complete network. In contrast, if costs are at an intermediate level
(f < c < b), a richer set of congurations is possible. On the one hand, since c > f(> e);
the link formation is only worthwhile if other players are choosing the same action. On the
other hand, since c < b(< d); coordinating at either of the two equilibria (in the underlying
coordination game) is better than not playing the game at all. This allows for networks
with two disconnected components in equilibria. The former considerations are reected
by the following result, whose proof is given in Appendix A.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose (1 and (2) hold. (a) If c < minff; bg; then an equilibrium
network is complete. (b) If f < c < b; then an equilibrium network is either complete or
can be partitioned into two complete components.
18
(c) If b < c < d; then an equilibrium
network is either empty or complete. (d) If c > d; then the unique equilibrium network is
empty.
Next, we characterize the Nash equilibria of the static game. First, we introduce some con-
venient notation. On the one hand, recall that g
e
denotes the empty network characterized
by g
e
ij
= 0 for all i; j 2 N (i 6= j): We shall say that a network g is essential if g
ij
g
ji
= 0,
for every pair of players i and j. Also, let G
c
 fg : 8i; j 2 N; g
ij
= 1; g
ij
g
ji
= 0g
stand for the set of complete and essential networks on the set N: Analogously, for any
18
Our parameter conditions allow both f < b and b < f: If the latter inequality holds, Part (b) of
Proposition 3.1 (and also that of Proposition 3.2 below) applies trivially.
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given subset M  N; denote by G
c
(M) the set of complete and essential subgraphs on M:
Given any state s 2 S; we shall say that s = (g; a) 2 S
h
for some h 2 f; g if g 2 G
c
and a
i
= h for all i 2 N: More generally, we shall write s = (g; a) 2 S

if there exists a
partition of the population into two subgroups, N

and N

(one of them possibly empty),
and corresponding components of g; g
a
and g

; such that: (i) g
a
2 G
c
(N

); g

2 G
c
(N

);
and (ii) 8i 2 N

; a
i
= ; 8i 2 N

, a
i
= : With this notation in hand, we may state the
following result.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose (1) and (2) hold. (a) If c < minff; bg; then the set of equilib-
rium states S

= S

[ S

. (b) If f < c < b; then S

[ S

 S

 S

; the rst inclusion
being strict for large enough n: (c) If b < c < d; then S

= S

[ f(g
e
; (; ; :::; ))g. (d) If
c > d; then S

= fg
e
g  A
n
.
Parts (a) and (c) are intuitive; we therefore elaborate on the coexistence equilibria identied
in part (b). In these equilibria, there are two unconnected groups, with each group adopting
a common action (dierent in each group). The strategic stability of this conguration rests
on the appeal of `passive' links. A link such as g
ij
= 1 is paid for by player i, but both
players i and j derive payos from it. In a mixed equilibrium conguration, the links in
each group must be, roughly, evenly distributed. This means that all players enjoy some
benets from passive links. In contrast, if a player were to switch actions, then to derive
the full benets of this switch, she would have to form (active) links with everyone in the
new group. This lowers the incentives to switch, a consideration which becomes decisive if
the number of passive links is large enough (hence the requirement of large n).
The above result indicates that, whenever the cost of links is not excessively high (i.e. not
above the maximum payo attainable in the game), Nash equilibrium conditions allow for a
genuine outcome multiplicity. For example, under the parameter congurations allowed in
Parts (a) and (c), this multiplicity permits alternative states where either of the two actions
is homogeneously chosen by the whole population. Under the conditions of Part (b), the
multiplicity allows for a wide range of possible states where neither action homogeneity nor
full connectedness necessarily prevails. The model, therefore, raises a fundamental issue of
equilibrium selection.
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3.2 Dynamics
This section addresses the problem of equilibrium selection by using the techniques of
stochastic stability. As a rst step in this analysis, we establish convergence of the unper-
turbed dynamics for the relevant parameter range.
Let

S denote the set of absorbing states of the unperturbed dynamics. In view of the pos-
tulated adjustment process, it follows that there is an one-to-one correspondence between

S and the class of strict Nash equilibria of the social game, i.e.

S = S

: Proposition 3.2
characterizes all Nash equilibria of this game. But, clearly, if c < b; every Nash equilibrium
is strict, while if b < c < d; only the Nash equilibria in S

are strict. Since, on the other
hand, no strict Nash equilibrium exists if c > d, the next result focuses on the case where
c < d.
Proposition 3.3 Suppose (1)-(2) hold and c < d. Then, starting from any initial strategy
conguration, the best response dynamics converges to a strict Nash equilibrium of the
social game, with probability one.
The proof of the above result is given in Appendix A. This result delimits the set of states
that can potentially be stochastically stable since, obviously, every such state must be a
limit point for the unperturbed dynamics. Let the set of stochastically stable states be
denoted by
^
S  fs 2 S : ^(s) > 0g. The following result summarizes our analysis in the
direct-link model.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose (1) and (2) hold. There exists some c 2 (e; b) such that if c < c
then
^
S = S

while if c < c < d then
^
S = S

; provided n is large enough.
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Finally, if c > d
then
^
S = fg
e
g  A
n
.
In order to determine the support of the limit distribution ^, we use the well-known graph-
theoretic techniques developed by Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) for the analysis of perturbed
Markov chains, as applied by the aforementioned authors (Kandori et al. and Young) and
later simplied by Kandori and Rob (1995). They can be summarized as follows. Fix some
state s 2

S. An s-tree is a directed graph on

S whose root is s and such that there is
a unique (directed) path joining any other s
0
2

S to s: For each arrow s
0
! s
00
in any
given s-tree, a \cost" is dened as the minimum number of simultaneous mutations that
19
The proviso on n is simply required to deal with possible integer problems when studying the number
of mutations needed for the various transitions.
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are required for the transition from s
0
to s
00
to be feasible through the ensuing operation of
the unperturbed dynamics alone. The cost of the tree is obtained by adding up the costs
associated with all the arrows of a particular s-tree. The stochastic potential of s is dened
as the minimum cost across all s-trees. Then, a state s 2

S is seen to be stochastically
stable if it has the lowest stochastic potential across all s 2

S.
In our framework, individual strategies involve both link-formation and action choices.
This richness in the strategy space leads to a corresponding wide variety in the nature of
(strict) Nash equilibria of the social game. There are two facets of this variety: (a) we
obtain three dierent types of equilibria in terms of action conguration: S

, S

and S

;
and (b) there are a large number of strategy proles that support the complete connectivity
prevailing at equilibrium congurations. For example, in a game with 10 players, there are
2
45
dierent (link) strategy proles that can support a complete network. This proliferation
of equilibria leads us to develop a simple relationship between the dierent proles. In
particular, we consider strategy proles within the sets S
h
(h = ; ) and show that states
in each of these sets can be connected by a chain of single-mutation steps, each such
step followed by a suitable operation of the best-response dynamics. To state this result
precisely, it is convenient to introduce the metric d() on the space of networks that, for
each pair of networks g and g
0
, has their respective distance given by d(g; g
0
) = d(g
0
; g) 
P
i;j
jg
i;j
  g
0
i;j
j=2. In words, this distance is simply a measure of the number of links that
are dierent across the two networks. With this metric in place, we have:
Lemma 3.1 For each s 2 S
h
, h = ; ; there exists an s-tree restricted to S
h
such that
for all arrows s
0
! s
00
in it, d(g
0
; g
00
) = 1; where g
0
and g
00
are the networks respectively
associated to s
0
and s
00
.
The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix A. This lemma implies that, provided S
h


S;
the (restricted) tree established by Lemma 3.1 for any s 2 S
h
involves the minimum possible
cost


S
h


  1: This Lemma also indicates that, in the language of Samuelson (1994), S

(if
c < d) and also S

(if c < b) are recurrent sets. This allows each of them to be treated
as a single \entity" in the following two complementary senses: (i) if any state in one of
these recurrent sets is stochastically stable, so is every other state in this same set; (ii) in
evaluating the minimum cost involved in a transition to, or away from, any given state in a
recurrent set, the sole relevant issue concerns the minimum cost associated to a transition
to, or away from, some state in that recurrent set. Using (i)-(ii), the analysis of the model
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can be greatly simplied. To organize matters, it is useful to consider dierent ranges for
c separately.
Let us start with the case where 0 < c < e, where the set of absorbing states

S = S

[S

.
Since, by Lemma 3.1, the sets S

and S

are each recurrent, the crucial point here is to
assess what is the minimum mutation cost across all path joining some state in S
h
to some
state in S
h
0
for each h; h
0
= ; ; h 6= h
0
: Denote these mutation costs by m
h;h
0
and let dze
stand for the smallest integer no smaller than any given z 2 R
+
: With this notation in
place, we state:.
Lemma 3.2 Suppose that 0 < c < e. Then,
m
;
=
&
b  e
(d  f) + (b  e)
(n  1)
'
; m
;
=
&
d  f
(d  f) + (b  e)
(n  1)
'
:
Thus, m
;
> m
;
; for large enough n.
The proof, given in Appendix A, reects the standard considerations arising in much
of the recent evolutionary theory when the xed pattern of interaction involves every
individual of the population playing with all others. Now, if costs are low (c < e); such full
connectivity is not just assumed but it endogenously follows from players' own decisions,
both at equilibrium (i.e. when the unperturbed best-response dynamics is at a rest-point)
and away from it. In eect, this implies that the same basin-of-attraction considerations
that privilege risk-dominance in the received approach also select for it in the present case.
We next examine the case where e < c < minff; bg where

S = S

[ S

. Now, since c > e;
players who choose action  no longer nd it attractive to form links with other players
who choose action . This factor plays a crucial role in the analysis. The following result
derives the relative magnitude of the minimum mutation costs.
Lemma 3.3 Suppose e < c < minff; bg. Then,
m
;
=
&
b  c
(d  f) + (b  c)
(n  1)
'
; m
;
=
&
d  f
(d  f) + (b  e)
(n  1)
'
:
Thus, there is some ~c; e < ~c  minff; bg; such that if c < ~c then m
;
 m
;
> 0, while if
c > ~c then m
;
 m
;
< 0, for large enough n.
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The methods used to prove this lemma are quite general; we use them in establishing a
number of other lemmas, both in the proof of Theorem 3.1 and that of Theorem 4.1. It is
therefore useful to explain them in the text.
Proof of Lemma 3.3: Let s

and s

be generic states in S

and S

, respectively.
Step 1: Consider transitions from state s

to state s

and let k be the number of mutations
triggering it. If this transition is to take place after those many mutations, there must be
some player currently choosing  (i.e. who has not mutated) that may then voluntarily
switch to . Denote by q
h
the number of active links this player chooses to support to
players choosing h (h = ; ) and let r
h
stand for the number of passive links she receives
from players choosing h (h = ; ): If she chooses ; her payo is given by:


= r

d+ r

e + q

(d  c); (6)
where we implicitly use the fact that q

must equal zero { since c > e; an agent who
switches to  will not nd it worthwhile to support any link to players choosing : On the
other hand, if the agent in question were to continue adopting ; her payo would be equal
to:


= r^

f + r^

b + q^

(f   c) + q^

(b  c); (7)
where q^
h
and r^
h
are interpreted as the active and passive links that would be chosen by the
player if she decided to adopt : Clearly, we must have r
h
= r^
h
for each h = ; : Thus, if
a switch to  is to take place, it must be that


  

= (r

+ q

)d  (r

+ q^

)f   r

(b  e)  q^

(b  c)  0: (8)
Note that r

+ q

= k, since c < d and therefore the player who switches to  will want to
be linked (either passively or by supporting herself a link) to all other players choosing ;
i.e. to the total number k of -mutants. On the other hand, since c < minff; bg; we must
also have that r^

+ q^

= n  k   1 and r

+ q^

= r^

+ q^

= k, i.e. the player who chooses
 must become linked to all other players, both those choosing  and those choosing :
We now ask the following question: What is the lowest value of k consistent with (8)?
Since c > e; the desired payo advantage of action  will occur for the lowest value of k
when r

= r^

= 0 and therefore q^

= n  k  1. That is, if the desired transition is to take
place, the necessary condition (8) holds for the minimum number of required mutations
when the arbitrary agent that must start the transition has no passive links to individuals
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choosing action : Recall that m
;
stands for the minimum number of mutations required
for the transition. Now introducing the above observations in (8), we obtain the following
lower bound
m
;

b  c
(d  f) + (b  c)
(n  1)  H: (9)
The above expression gives the minimum number of players choosing  that are needed to
induce some player to switch to action  across all possible network structures. Next, we
argue that this number of mutations is also suÆcient to induce a transition from some s

to some s

. The proof is constructive. The main idea is to consider a particular state s

where its corresponding (complete) network displays the maximal responsiveness to some
suitably chosen mutations. Using the observations on the distribution of active and passive
links, this is seen to occur when there are some players who support links to all others {
those are, of course, players with a \critical" role whose mutation would be most eective.
Specically, suppose that the network prevailing in s

has every player i = 1; 2; :::; n support
active links to all j > i. (This means, for example, that player 1 supports links to every
other player whereas player n only has passive links.) Then, recalling that dze denotes
the smallest integer no smaller than z; the most mutation-eective way of inducing the
population to switch actions from  to  is precisely by having the players ` = 1; 2; :::; dHe
simultaneously mutate to action  and maintain all their links. Thereafter, a transition
to some state s

will occur if subsequent strategy revision opportunities are appropriately
sequenced so that every player with index j = dHe+1; :::; n is given a revision opportunity
in order. This, in eect, shows that the lower bound in (9) is tight and m
;
= dHe:
Step 2: Consider next the transition from some state s

to a state s

and let again k be the
number of mutations (now towards ) triggering it. Using arguments from Step 1 above,
it is easy to show that m
;
; must satisfy:
m
;

d  f
(d  f) + (b  e)
(n  1)  H
0
: (10)
Again, we can use previous arguments to show that dH
0
e is suÆcient.
Step 3: Finally, we wish to study the dierence m
;
 m
;
as a function of c: For low c
(close to e) and large n, this dierence is clearly positive in view of the hypothesis that
b   e > d   f . Next, to verify that it switches strict sign at most once in the range
c 2 (e;minff; bg); note that H   H
0
is strictly declining with respect to c in the interval
(e;minff; bg). 2
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Lemma 3.3 applies both to the case where b < f and that where b > f: Suppose rst that
b < f: Then, since H   H
0
< 0 for c = b; a direct combination of former considerations
leads to the desired conclusion for the parameter range c 2 (e; b]: We now take up the case
f < b and focus on the range c 2 (f; b). We rst derive the relative magnitude of the
minimum mutation costs for s 2 S
h
, where h = f; g.
Lemma 3.4 Suppose f < c < b.
~m
;
=
&
b  c
(d  f) + (b  c)
(n  1)
'
; ~m
;
=
&
d  c
(d  c) + (b  e)
(n  1)
'
:
Thus there is a threshold c 2 [f; b) such that if c < c then m
;
 m
;
> 0, while if c > ~c
then m
;
 m
;
< 0, for large enough n.
The arguments needed to establish this result are very similar to those used in the proof
of Lemma 3.3; we provide the computations in Appendix A.
The principal complication in case c 2 [f; b) is that the set of absorbing states in not
restricted to S

[ S

but will generally include mixed states where the population is
segmented into two dierent action components (cf. Propositions 3.2 and 3.3). Let m
h;
,
for h = ; , denote the minimum number of mutations needed to ensure a transition from
some s 2 S
h
to some s 2 S

. The rst point to note is that by the construction used in
Lemma 3.3, m
;
 m
;
and, similarly, m
;
 m
;
. This implies that the transition
from any state in some S
h
towards a mixed equilibrium state in S

is not costlier than a
transition towards S
h
0
(h
0
6= h): Concerning now the converse transitions (i.e. from states
in S

to either S

or S

); the following lemma indicates that it is relatively \easy" since
it involves a suitable chain of single mutations..
Lemma 3.5 Let f < c < b and consider any equilibrium state s 2 S

involving two non-
degenerate ( and ) components, g

and g

, with cardinalities j A(s) j> 0 and j B(s) j> 0,
respectively. Then, there is another equilibrium state s
0
with cardinality for the resulting
 component jA(s
0
)j  jA(s)j+ 1 that can be reached from s by a suitable single mutation
followed by the best-response dynamics. An identical conclusion applies to some equilibrium
state s
00
with j A(s
00
) jj A(s) j  1.
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The proof of this Lemma is given in Appendix A. We briey sketch the argument here. Fix
some mixed state, and suppose the strategy of some player i 2 A(s) mutates as follows:
she switches to action , while everything else remains as before. Now, have all the players
in the  group move and suppose that they still wish to keep playing action . Since
c < f , their best response is to delete their links with player i. Next, have all the players
in group  move; their best response is to form a link with player i. This is true since the
original state was an equilibrium, and c < b. Finally, have player i choose a best response;
since the original state was an equilibrium and c > f , her best response is to play action 
and delete all links with players in the  group. We have thus increased the number of 
players with a single mutation. This argument extends in a natural manner to prove the
above result. We now have all the information to complete the proof of the Theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Consider rst the case where c < b. If f > b; the sets S

and S

are the only candidates for stochastic stability and we simply need to compare m
;
versus
m
;
: Then, the desired conclusion follows directly from Lemmas 3.2-3.4. The same applies
if f < b but c < f: Thus, consider the case where f < c < b: Then, the states in S

, S

;
and S

are possible candidates for stochastic stability. Take any state s 2 S
h
for some
h = ; : With the help of Lemmas 3.1 and 3.5 we can infer that s-trees for any s 2 S

will have the following minimum cost: m
;
+ jS

j+


S



+


S



  2: For any s
0
2 S

; the
situation is symmetric, the minimum cost being equal to m
;
+ jS

j +


S



 +


S



   2:
Next, concerning any s 2 S

, we note that the corresponding s-tree would have to display
a path joining some state in S

to s and some path joining some state in S

to s: Thus, the
cost of such an s-tree will be at least m
;
+m
;
+ jS

j+


S



+



~
S



  1. This expression
is greater than the minimum s-tree costs for s 2 S
h
(h = ; ) since each m
h;h
0
> 1 if the
population is large. We therefore conclude that a state s 2 S

cannot be stochastically
stable. Again, therefore, the problem boils down to a comparison of m
;
versus m
;
which, as before, leads to the desired conclusion.
Next, suppose that b < c < d: Then, the key point to observe is that the set of strict
Nash equilibria and hence the set of absorbing states is simply

S = S

. This immediately
establishes the result for this case. Finally, similar considerations apply to the case where
c > d; in which case Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 indicate that

S = fg
e
g  A
n
: 2
In our analysis we have not placed any restrictions on the number of links a player can
form and, in equilibrium, the nature of interaction is `global'. This has the implication
that transitions from one strict Nash equilibrium to another require a number of mutations
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which is a proportion of the total number of players. As is well known, for large populations
this implies that the rate of convergence will be slow. We discuss a model with limited
links and its implications for rates of convergence in the conclusion.
4 Indirect Links
In this section, we turn to the context where each player interacts with all players to whom
she is joined by a path in the network. We rst characterize the Nash equilibria of the
social game (Subsection 4.1) and then provide a complete characterization of the set of
stochastically stable states (Subsection 4.2).
4.1 Equilibrium outcomes
Our rst result derives some basic properties of equilibrium networks and actions.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose (1) and (3) hold. Then; any equilibrium network is either min-
imally connected or empty. Furthermore, if the equilibrium network is connected, everyone
chooses the same action and social conformism obtains.
The proofs of all the results in this Subsection (Propositions 4.1-4.3) are given in Appendix
B. The above proposition shows that, if any pair of indirectly linked agents play the game,
the social disconnectedness and heterogeneity allowed in the direct-link model is no longer
possible: in equilibrium, any non-empty equilibrium network must be connected (i.e. dene
a single component), and every player is to choose the same action. The simple intuition
behind this contrast is related to the dierent appeal of passive links in either model.
Recall that, in the setting with direct links, two components displaying dierent actions
could be sustained at equilibrium (if f < c < b) because an individual wanting to switch
actions and links with the other component must be prepared to forego the benets of the
passive links otherwise springing from her current component. But these lost benets can
only be compensated by bearing the cost of linking to each of the members of the other
component, a cost that can be prohibitive in those circumstances. Instead, in the setting
with indirect links, a player from one component can play with every player in the other
component by forming a single link with someone in that component. Thus, in this case,
the considerations arising from passive links cannot overcome, for all players, the large
payo gains to be earned by linking cheaply (i.e. though a single link) with the other
component.
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The requirement of minimal connectedness allows a wide range of network architectures.
This motivates us to examine the requirement of strictness on Nash equilibria, a condition
which was obtained \for free" in the direct-link model (when the social network is non-
empty). An additional justication for our interest in strict Nash equilibria is that, as
explained, all of the rest points of the unperturbed dynamics must correspond to strict
Nash equilibria of the social game. The following result shows that `strictness' is indeed
quite eective in our setting.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose (1) and (3) hold. Then, a strict Nash network is either empty
or a center-sponsored star.
To gain some intuition on the above result, consider any Nash equilibrium network (mini-
mally connected, by virtue of Proposition 4.1) that is not a center-sponsored star. { recall
that a center-sponsored star is a network in which a single agent supports a link with
every other player. Then, there has to be a player i who forms a link with some player
j; the latter in turn being linked to some third player k 6= i: To see that the underlying
strategy conguration cannot dene a strict Nash equilibrium, simply note that player i
can interchange her link with player j for a link with player k and still get the same payos.
Of course, the only kind of network which is immune to this problem is one in which a
single player supports all existing links. A center-sponsored star, in other words, is the
only candidate for a strict Nash network.
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The above result on strict Nash networks helps us achieve a full characterization of strict
Nash equilibria for dierent values of c: Let G
cs
stand for the collection of networks that
dene a center-sponsored star. Furthermore, denote
~
S

 G
cs
 f; ::g and
~
S

 G
cs

f; ::g: Finally, recall that S

represents the set of strict Nash equilibria.
Proposition 4.3 Suppose (1) and (3) hold. If 0 < c < b; then S

=
~
S

[
~
S

, while if
b < c < d, then S

=
~
S

. Finally, if c > d, then there is no strict Nash equilibrium.
20
Our analysis assumes that a direct link is as good as an indirect link. The center-sponsored star
remains a strict Nash equilibrium network in more general models of indirect links, where payos are lower
for games with more distant players. However, in the general setting, it is not be the unique strict Nash
network.
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The above result parallels, for the present context, the characterization provided by Propo-
sition 3.2 for the direct-link scenario. We note some important dierences. First, since
all equilibrium networks must be connected (cf. Proposition 4.1), co-existence of the two
actions,  and ; is ruled out at any equilibrium conguration. A second interesting dier-
ence is that the requirement of strictness amounts here to a genuine renement criterion
(i.e. many Nash equilibria are not strict), even when c < b: We do note, however, that for
the interesting class of parameters, c < b, either actions  or  can be sustained in a strict
equilibrium. Next, we address this multiplicity problem.
4.2 Dynamics
In this section we tackle the problem of equilibrium selection, again relying on the tech-
niques of stochastic stability. As a rst step in this analysis, we establish convergence of
the unperturbed dynamics.
Proposition 4.4 Suppose (1) and (3) hold. If c < d, then starting from any initial strategy
conguration the best response dynamics converges to one of the strict equilibrium identied
in Proposition 4.3, with probability one. If c > d, the best response dynamics converges to
the set fg
e
g  A
n
, with probability one.
The proof of the above result follows from suitable adaptations of arguments used in
Theorem 4.1 in Bala and Goyal (2000). These arguments are very long since they involve
a consideration of a variety of sub-cases. Here, we simply outline that the four main
steps involve establishing that the following transitions have positive probability for the
unperturbed dynamics:
21
 From any given initial state, the process transits to a state in which the network is
minimally connected.
 If c < d, the process transits from a minimally connected state to one where players
are \agglomerated" in the following sense: every two of them are at a distance of no
more than 2 (i.e., the maximum number of links between them is two).
 If c < d, the process transits from an agglomerated state (as described above) to a
center-sponsored star where every agent plays the same action.
21
The proof of this result is available from the authors upon request.
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 If c > d, the process transits from any minimally connected state to the empty
network.
Proposition 4.4 establishes that the unperturbed dynamics converges, almost surely, to one
of the strict Nash equilibria identied in Proposition 4.3. This connes the set of limit
points that we need to consider in our analysis of stochastically stability. As before, the
set of these stochastically stable states will be denoted by
^
S:
Theorem 4.1 Suppose (1) and (3) hold. There exists some c 2 (e; b) such that if c < c
then
^
S =
~
S

, while if c < c < d then
^
S =
~
S

; provided n is large enough.
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Finally, if
c > d then
^
S = fg
e
g  A
n
.
Thus, in analogy with our analysis for the scenario with direct links, one nds a sharp
relationship between the cost of link formation and individual behavior in coordination
games. That is, there is a certain threshold c 2 (e; b) which separates the regions where the
ineÆcient and eÆcient equilibrium actions are selected. We note, however, an important
dierence with regard to the architecture of the networks which was already anticipated
by our static analysis of the game: if indirect links are allowed, a center-sponsored star is
the only robust (here, stochastically stable) architecture that supports the full connectivity
required when c < d:
Our proof of Theorem 4.1 follows broadly along the same lines as that of Theorem 3.1.
First, we note that, in view of Proposition 4.4, only the states in
~
S

(if c < d) and also
those in S

(if c < b) are possible candidates for stochastic stability. Second, we note
that the two sets, S

and S

, are recurrent in each case (recall Lemma 3.1 and its ensuing
discussion). To verify this claim, assume for concreteness that c < b and consider any two
states s; s
0
2
~
S
h
, with h = ; : We argue that a transition from s to s
0
can be triggered
by a single mutation followed by the operation of the unperturbed dynamics. Specically,
let i and j be the two central players in the center-sponsored stars dened by s and s
0
,
respectively. Then, if the central player i mutates at s and removes all her links (still
keeping her former action), a transition to s
0
will materialize provided that, subsequently,
player j alone is given a revision opportunity.
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The proviso on n is simply required to deal with possible integer problems when studying the number
of mutations needed for transition between dierent states.
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As in the direct links setting, the fact that
~
S

and
~
S

are recurrent states (provided c < d
or c < b; respectively) simplies the analysis substantially. Consider rst the case where
b < c < d: Here we know from Proposition 4.4 that
^
S 
~
S

and, consequently, since
~
S

is recurrent,
^
S =
~
S

. On the other hand, if c < b (and therefore c < d as well), we have
^
S 
~
S

[
~
S

and the conclusion hinges upon the minimum number of mutations needed to
implement the transitions from some state s 2
~
S
h
(h = ; ) to some other state s
0
2
~
S
h
0
(h 6= h
0
). In analogy with previous notation, denote by ~m
h;h
0
such a minimum number
of mutations. Then, the recurrent set
~
S
h
selected (i.e.
^
S =
~
S
h
) is that one for which
~m
h;h
0
> ~m
h
0
;h
.
Now, we compute ~m
h;h
0
(h; h
0
= ; ; h 6= h
0
) for dierent values of c in the interval (0; b):
As direct counterparts of the corresponding results established for the direct-link scenario,
we have the following results. (Recall that dze denotes the smallest integer no smaller than
z):
Lemma 4.1 Suppose that 0 < c < e. Then,
~m
;
=
&
b  e
(d  f) + (b  e)
(n  1)
'
; ~m
;
=
&
d  f
(d  f) + (b  e)
(n  1)
'
:
Lemma 4.2 Suppose e  c  minff; bg. Then,
~m
;
=
&
b  c
(d  f) + (b  c)
(n  1)
'
; ~m
;
=
&
d  f
(d  f) + (b  e)
(n  1)
'
:
Lemma 4.3 Suppose f  c  b. Then,
~m
;
=
&
b  c
(d  f) + (b  c)
(n  1)
'
; ~m
;
=
&
d  c
(d  c) + (b  e)
(n  1)
'
:
The proofs of Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2 are given in Appendix B, while that of Lemma
4.3 is omitted since it is identical to the latter. The general approach is parallel to the
proofs of Lemmas 3.2-3.3 above. We rst derive the minimum number of mutations needed
for transition across all possible network architectures. Then, we show that this minimum
number is also suÆcient, given the specic star architecture of the equilibrium networks
under consideration. The main dierence in the argument arises out of the fact that, in
making payo comparisons, individual players are concerned with the size of the compo-
nent they are connecting to, and not just the payo from the single game played with
the connected player. This alters the individual payo expressions and necessitates some
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additional arguments. The main point, however, is that these alterations in the payos
do not alter the essential relationship, identied in Theorem 3.1, between costs of forming
links and individual behavior in coordination games.
In view of Lemmas 4.1-4.3, the proof of Theorem 4.1 then follows from the observation
that, for all c 2 (0; b), the minimum number of mutations required to make the transition
from
~
S
h
to
~
S
h
0
(h; h
0
= ; ; h 6= h
0
) in the present indirect-link model is exactly the same
as that required to make the transition from S
h
to S
h
0
in the former direct-link model.
Thus, ~m
h;h
0
= m
h;h
0
for any c in each of the three parameter ranges, which leads to the
desired conclusions by relying on the same arguments as for Theorem 3.1.
We now briey discuss the similarity in the number of mutations needed for transition
in the direct and the indirect links models. For concreteness we consider the case where
e < c < f and focus on the transition from s

to s

. The main point to note is that
a player will link with other players choosing action  irrespective of his own choice of
action, while if a player chooses action  then he will only form links with others choosing
 and not form links with players who are choosing . In the direct links model, Lemma
3.3 focuses on the network where the player receives passive links from all the players who
have mutated to action  while he has to form active links with each of the players who
are still choosing . In the indirect links model, Lemma 4.2 considers a network where the
center and the other players whose strategies have mutated to  are in a single component,
while the players who choose  have become isolated due to the deletion of links by the
center. In this case if the best-responding player chooses  then he has to form links with
each of the other players choosing . Thus the number of links to be formed with the
players who choose  and hence the mutations required for transition are the same in the
direct and indirect links models.
5 Concluding Remarks
We develop a model to study the interaction between partner choice and individual behavior
in games of coordination. We start with a setting, in which two players can play a game
only if they have a direct link between them. We then consider a setting where two players
can play the game if they are directly or indirectly linked. Our analysis establishes that
individual incentives to economize on link formation costs lead, in both cases, to simple
network architectures. In the rst context, the unique equilibrium architecture is the
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complete network, while in the second one the unique equilibrium architecture is a star.
We show that network formation is intimately related to equilibrium selection in both
setups: at low costs of forming links, individuals coordinate on the risk-dominant action,
while for high costs of forming links individuals coordinate on the eÆcient action. Thus in
each of these two contexts, while the network architecture remains the same, the nature of
coordination varies with the cost of forming links. These results suggest that the process of
network formation per se has powerful implications for the nature of social coordination.
We now discuss some of the main assumptions underlying the analysis. An important
aspect of our model is that link formation is one-sided. From a methodological point of
view this formulation has the advantage that it allows us to study the social process of link
formation and coordination as a non-cooperative game. Moreover, from a substantive point
of view this formulation is interesting since it allows for an explicit consideration of the role
of active and passive links. Our analysis suggests that this distinction has implications for
the coexistence of conventions as well as for the stochastic stability of dierent outcomes.
In some settings, it is more natural to think of link formation as a two-sided process, i.e.
any link being formed leads both of the players involved to incur some costs. In this case
both players should acquiesce in the formation of the link. In independent work, Droste,
Gilles and Johnson (1999) and Jackson and Watts (1999) study a two-sided link model
with direct links (i.e. only directly connected individuals play the game). There are some
dierences in the details of the two models but the overall analysis is quite similar; thus,
we focus our discussion on the paper by Jackson and Watts. They nd, like us, that the
equilibrium network is complete. However their results on social coordination are quite
dierent. For instance, they nd that, if the costs of link formation are high, all those
states where players choose a common action (but either of the two) are stochastically
stable. Instead, we have found that, when the costs are high (but below the maximum
achievable payo), the only stochastically stable states involve players choosing the eÆcient
action. This contrast arises out of modeling dierences in the link formation process and
the timing of moves. Specically, Jackson and Watts postulate that individuals choose
links and actions separately, i.e. players choose links taking actions as given while they
choose actions taking the links as a given. By contrast, in our setting, any individual
undertaking a revision is allowed to impinge on every dimension of her choice and change
both her action and her supported links. This suggests that it should be interesting to
study the eects of varying levels of exibility in the two choice dimensions, links and
29
actions{ for example, it seems natural to allow for the possibility that link revision might
be more rigid than action change.
Another important assumption in our model concerns the number of links allowed or,
relatedly, the shape (e.g. concavity or convexity) of the underlying cost function. In our
model, we have imposed no limit on the number of links a player can support and the
marginal cost of any additional link has been assumed constant. In general, it seems
more plausible that players might be constrained in the number of links they can support
due to time and resource constraints. Formally, this can be modeled either by directly
imposing a restriction on the number of links (by establishing a xed upper bound) or
indirectly deriving it from a suÆciently convex cost function. We feel that such a bounded
links model may be more amenable to weaker assumptions concerning information on the
network and the action proles of players. The limited links assumption is likely have
important eects on some aspects of the analysis. In the rst place, such a formulation is
likely to lead to partially connected (sparse) networks being stable. Building upon insights
gleaned from existing evolutionary literature (recall the Introduction), this should in turn
have signicant implications in at least two respects. On the one hand, it may favor the
long-run selection of eÆciency by allowing the creation of isolated havens or islands, from
which eÆcient behavior can spread throughout the whole population. On the other hand,
it is also likely to speed up convergence to the long-run (stochastically stable) states by
dispensing with the need of resorting to a large number of simultaneous mutations to
trigger the required transitions.
6 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 3.1: The proof of part (a) follows directly from the fact that c < f
and is omitted. We provide a proof of part (b). In this case f < c < b. We rst show
that a
i
= a
j
= a, if i; j belong to the same component. Suppose not. If g
ij
= 1, then
it follows that the player forming a link can protably deviate by deleting the link, since
c > f . Similar arguments apply if i and j are indirectly connected. We next show that if
i 2 g
0
and j 2 g
00
, where g
0
and g
00
are two components in an equilibrium network g, then
a
i
6= a
j
. If a
i
= a
j
then the minimum payo to i from playing the coordination game with
j is b. Since c < b, player i gains by forming a link, i.e. choosing g
ij
= 1. Thus g is not
an equilibrium network. The nal step is to note that since there are only two actions in
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the coordination game, there can be at most two distinct components. We note that the
completeness of each component follows from the assumption that c < b.
We next prove part (c). There are two subcases to consider: c > maxfb; fg or b < c < f:
(Note, of course, that the former subcase is the only one possible if b > f:) Suppose rst
that c > maxfb; fg, and let g be an equilibrium network which is non-empty but also
incomplete. From the above arguments in (b), it follows that if g
i;j
= 1; then a
i
= a
j
= .
Moreover, if a
j
= ; then player j can have no links in the network. (These observations
follow directly from the hypothesis that c > maxfb; fg.) However, since g is assumed
incomplete, there must exist a pair of agents, i and j; such that g
ij
= 0. First, suppose
that a
i
= a
j
= . Then, since c < d; it is clearly protable for either of the two players
to deviate and form a link with the other player. Suppose next that a
i
= a
j
= . Then,
players i and j can have no links and, furthermore, since g is non-empty, there must be
at least two other players k; l 2 N such that a
k
= a
l
= . But then player i can increase
her payo by choosing action  and linking to player k. Finally, consider the case where
a
i
6= a
j
and let player i choose . Then, if this player deviates to action  and forms a link
with player j she increases her payo strictly. We have thus shown that g
ij
= 0 cannot
be part of an equilibrium network. This proves that a non-empty but incomplete network
cannot be an equilibrium network in the rst sub-case considered.
Consider now the case b < c < f and suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that g is
an equilibrium network which is non-empty but incomplete. Since b < c < d, it follows
directly that not every player chooses action  or . Moreover, in the mixed conguration,
all the players who choose  are directly linked (since c < d), there is a link between
every pair of players who choose dissimilar actions (since c < f), but there are no links
between players choosing  (since b < c). But then it follows that every player choosing 
can increase her payo by switching to action . This contradicts the hypothesis that the
mixed conguration is an equilibrium. This completes the argument for part (c).
Part (d) is immediate from the hypothesis that c > d. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.2: We start proving Part (a). In view of Part (a) of Proposition
3.1 and the fact that the underlying game is of a coordination type, the inclusion S

[
S

 S

is obvious. To show the converse inclusion, take any prole s such that the sets
A(s)  fi 2 N : a
i
= g and B(s)  fj 2 N : a
j
= g are both non-empty. We claim that
such an s cannot be an equilibrium.
Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that such a state s is a Nash equilibrium of the game
and denote u  jA(s)j ; 0 < u < n: Recall from Proposition 3.1 that every Nash network
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in this parameter range is complete. This implies that for any player i 2 A(s); we must
have:
(u  1)d+ (n  u)e  
d
(i; g)  c  (u  1)f + (n  u)b  
d
(i; g)  c (11)
and for players j 2 B(s) :
(n  u  1)b+ uf   
d
(j; g)  c  (n  u  1)e+ ud  
d
(j; g)  c: (12)
It is easily veried that (11) and (12) are incompatible.
Now, we turn to Part (b). The inclusion S

[ S

 S

is trivial. To show that the
inclusion S

 S

holds strictly for large enough n; consider a state s where both A(s)
and B(s); dened as above, are both non-empty and complete components. Specically,
focus attention on those congurations that are symmetric within each component, so that
every player in A(s) supports
u 1
2
links and every player in B(s) supports
n u 1
2
links. (As
before, u stands for the cardinality of A(s) and we implicitly assume, for simplicity, that
u and n  u are odd numbers.) For this conguration to be a Nash equilibrium, we must
have that the players in A(s) satisfy:
d(u  1) 
u  1
2
c  f
u  1
2
+ b(n  u)  c(n  u) (13)
where we use the fact that, in switching to action ; any player formerly in A(s) will have
to support herself all links to players in B(s) and will no longer support any links to other
players in A(s) { of course, she still anticipate playing with those players from A(s) who
support links with him.
On the other hand, the counterpart condition for players in B(s) is:
(n  u  1)b 
n  u  1
2
c  du+ e
n  u  1
2
  cu (14)
where, in this case, we rely on considerations for players in B(s) that are analogous to
those explained before for players in A(s): Straightforward algebraic manipulations show
that (13) is equivalent to:
u
n

1
n
2d  c  f
2b + 2d  3c  f
+
2(b  c)
2b+ 2d  3c  f
(15)
and (14) is equivalent to:
u
n

1
n
c+ e  2b
2b + 2d  3c  e
+
2b  c  e
2b+ 2d  3c  e
: (16)
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We now check that, under the present parameter conditions:
2b  c  e
2b + 2d  3c  e
>
2(b  c)
2b+ 2d  3c  f
: (17)
Denote Y  2b  c, Z  2b + 2d  3c, and rewrite the above inequality as follows:
Y   e
Y   c
>
Z   e
Z   f
(18)
which is weaker than:
Y   e
Y   f
>
Z   e
Z   f
(19)
since c > f: The function (z) 
z e
z f
is uniformly decreasing in z since b > f > e:
Therefore; since Y < Z; (19) obtains, which implies (18). Hence it follows that, if n is
large enough, one can nd suitable values of u such that (15) and (16) jointly apply. This
completes the proof of Part (b).
We now present the proof for part (c). We know from Proposition 3.1 that the complete and
the empty network are the only two possible equilibrium networks. Since c > b > f > e,
it is immediate that, in the complete network, every player must choose  and this is a
Nash equilibrium. Then note that, for the empty network to be an equilibrium, it should
be the case that no player has an incentive to form a link. This implies that every player
must choose . On the other hand, it is easy to see that the empty network with everyone
choosing  is a Nash equilibrium.
The proof of part (d) follows directly from the hypothesis c > maxfd; b; f; eg. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.3: It is enough to show that, from any given state s
0
, there is a
nite chain of positive-probability events (bounded above zero, since the number of states
is nite) that lead to a rest point of the best response dynamics.
Choose one of the two strategies, say ; and denote by B(0) the set of individuals adopting
action  at s
0
. Order these individuals in some pre-specied manner and starting with
the rst one suppose that they are given in turn the option to revise their choices (both
concerning strategy and links). If at any given stage  , the player i in question does not
want to change strategies, we set B( + 1) = B() and proceed to the next player if some
are still left. If none is left, the rst phase of the procedure stops. On the other hand, if
the player i considered at stage  switches from  to ; then we make B( +1) = B()nfig
and, at stage  + 1; re-start the process with the rst-ranked individual in B( + 1); i.e.
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not with the player following i: Clearly, this rst phase of the procedure must eventually
stop at some nite 
1
.
Then, consider the players choosing strategy  at 
1
and denote this set by A(
1
) 
NnB(
1
): Proceed as above with a chain of unilateral revision opportunities given to players
adopting  in some pre-specied sequence, restarting the process when anyone switches
from  to : Again, the second phase of the procedure ends at some nite 
2
:
By construction, in this second phase, all strategy changes involve an increase in the
number of players adopting , i.e. B(
2
)  B(
1
): Thus, if the network links aecting
players in B(
1
) remain unchanged throughout, it is clear that no player in this set would
like to switch to  if given the opportunity at 
2
+ 1. However, in general, their network
links will also evolve in this second phase, because individual players in A(
1
) may form or
delete links with players in B(
1
). In principle, this could alter the situation of individual
members of B(
1
) and provide them with incentives to switch from  to . It can be shown,
however, that this is not the case. To show it formally, consider any given typical individual
in B(
1
) and denote by r^
h
; h = ; ; the number of links received (but not supported) by
this player from players choosing action h. On the other hand, denote u^  jA(
1
)j. Then,
since the rst phase of the procedure stops at 
1
; one must have:
max
q

;q

b(q

+ r^

) + f(q

+ r^

)  c(q

+ q

)
 max
q

;q

e(q

+ r^

) + d(q

+ r^

)  c(q

+ q

)
(20)
for all q

; q

such that 0  q

 u^   r^

; 0  q

 n   u^   1   r^

: Now denote by ~r
h
and ~u the counterpart of the previous magnitudes (r^
h
and u^) prevailing at 
2
: We now
show that ~u  u^; ~r

 r^

, and ~r

 r^

: First, we note that ~u  u^ by construction of the
process. Next note that if ~r

> r^

then this implies that some player who chooses action
 has formed an additional link with player i in the interval between 
1
and 
2
. This is
only possible if c < e. It also implies that player i did not have a link with this player at

1
. This is only possible if c > f , a contradiction. Thus ~r

 r^

. Finally note that ~r

 r^

follows from the fact that the all the players choosing  at 
1
do not revise their decisions
in the interval between 
1
and 
2
.
Therefore, (20) implies:
max
q

;q

b(q

+ ~r

) + f(q

+ ~r

)  c(q

+ q

)
 max
q

;q

e(q

+ ~r

) + d(q

+ ~r

)  c(q

+ q

)
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for all q

; q

such that 0  q

 ~u   ~r

; 0  q

 n   ~u   1   ~r

: This allows us to
conclude that the concatenation of the two phases will lead the process to a rest point of
the best response dynamics, as desired. 2
Proof of Lemma 3.1: The proof is constructive. Let s 2 S
h
, h = ; ; and order in
some arbitrary fashion all other states in S
h
nfsg: Also order in some discretionary manner
all pairs (i; j) 2 P  P with i 6= j: For the rst state in S
h
nfsg; say s
1
; proceed in the
pre-specied sequence across pairs (i; j) reversing the links of those of them whose links
are dierent from what they are in s: This produces a well-dened path joining s
1
to s;
whose constituent states dene a set denoted by Q
1
: Next, consider the highest ranked
state in S
h
nQ
1
; say s
2
: Proceed as before, until state s
2
is joined to either state s or a
state already included in Q
1
. Denote the states included in the corresponding path by Q
2
:
Clearly, when a stage n is reached such that S
h
n([
n
`=1
Q
`
) = ;; the procedure described
has fully constructed the desired s-tree restricted to S
h
: 2
Proof of Lemma 3.2: Let s

and s

be generic states in S

and S

, respectively. We
want to determine the minimum number of mutations needed to transit across a pair of
them in either direction.
(1). First, consider a transition from s

to s

and let k be the number of mutations trigger-
ing it. If this transition is to take place via the best-response dynamics after those many
mutations, there must be some player currently choosing  (i.e. who has not mutated)
that may then voluntarily switch to . As before, denote by q
h
the number of active links
this player supports to players choosing h (h = ; ) and let r
h
stand for the number of
passive links she receives from players choosing h (h = ; ): The payo from choosing 
for that player is given by:


= r

d+ r

e+ q

(d  c) + q

(e  c): (21)
On the other hand, the payo to choosing  is given by:


= r^

f + r^

b + q^

(f   c) + q^

(b  c); (22)
where q^
h
and r^
h
have the same interpretation of active and passive links as before, now
associated to the possibility that the player chooses : Clearly, we have q
h
= q^
h
and r
h
= r^
h
for each h = ; : Concerning the passive links, this is immediate; for active links, it follows
from the fact that, since c < e; a player will want to create links to all unconnected players,
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independently of what they do. Analogous considerations also ensure that (i). r

+ q

= k
and (ii). r

+ q

= n   k   1: Thus, in sum, for a transition from some state in S

to a
state in S

to be triggered, one must have:


  

= (r

+ q

)(d  f)  (r

+ q

)(b  e)
= k(d  f)  (n  k   1)(b  e)  0
Let m
;
stand for the minimum number of mutations which lead to such a transition. The
above considerations imply that
m
;

b  e
(d  f) + (b  e)
(n  1); (23)
which gives us the minimum number of mutations that are necessary for a transition from
any state s

to some s

. However, denoting by dze the smallest integer no smaller than z,
suppose that the strategies of d
b e
(d f)+(b e)
(n 1)e players undergo a simultaneous mutation
from any particular state s

(i.e. these players maintain their links but switch from  to
). Thereafter, the repeated operation of the best-response dynamics is suÆcient to induce
a transition to a state s

. Thus the necessary number of mutations computed above is also
suÆcient to induce a transition from any s

to some s

: That is, the inequality in (23)
holds with equality.
(2). Consider on the other hand, the transition s

to s

: Using the expressions (21) and
(22), we can deduce that the minimum number of mutations m
;
needed to transit from
some state in S

to a state in S

satises:
m
;

d  f
(d  f) + (b  e)
(n  1): (24)
As in the rst case, this gives us the minimum number of mutations needed for a transition.
However, consider any state s

and suppose that the strategies of d
d f
(d f)+(b e)
(n   1)e
players undergo a simultaneous mutation (i.e. they maintain their links but switch from 
to ). It again follows that the operation of the best-response dynamics suÆces to induce
a transition to a state s

. That is, (24) holds with equality.
To conclude, simply note that, if n is large enough,
&
b  e
(d  f) + (b  e)
(n  1)
'
<
&
d  f
(d  f) + (b  e)
(n  1)
'
since d  f < b  e. 2
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Proof of Lemma 3.4 (Sketch): The proof proceeds in the same way as the proof of
Lemma 3.3. We therefore only spell out the main computations.
(1). First, consider transitions from state s

to state s

and let k be the number of
mutations triggering it. We focus on a player currently choosing  and aim at nding the
most favorable (i.e. least mutation-costly) conditions that would induce him to switch to
. Along the lines explained in the proof of Lemma 3.3, this leads to the following lower
bound:
m
;

b  c
(d  f) + (b  c)
(n  1)  H; (25)
which again can be seen to be tight in the sense that, in fact, m
;
= hHi { recall that dze
stands for the smallest integer no smaller than z:
(2). Analogous considerations for a transition from state s

to state s

leads to the lower
bound
m
;

d  c
(b  e) + (d  c)
(n  1)  H
0
; (26)
which is also tight, i.e. m
;
= dH
0
e :
(3). Finally, to study how the sign of m
;
 m
;
changes for large n as a function of c;
note that
H  H
0
 (c) =
(b  c)(b  e)  (d  f)(d  c)
[(d  f) + (b  c)] [(b  e) + (d  c)]
(n  1): (27)
Observe that the denominator of (c) is always positive, the numerator is decreasing in c;
and is moreover negative at c = b. This completes the proof. 2
Proof of Lemma 3.5: Fix some s 2 S

, with the players A(s) and B(s) of the  and
 components displaying respective cardinalities jA(s)j  u > 0 and jB(s)j  n   u > 0,
respectively. To address the rst part of the Lemma, suppose that a player i 2 B(s)
experiences a mutation, which has the eect of switching her action from  to  and the
deletion of all her links with players in B(s). Now consider the players in the set B(s)nfig.
There are two possibilities: either all of them wish to retain action , or there is a player
who wishes to switch actions.
In the former case, let all of them move and they will retain their earlier strategy except
for one change: they will each delete their link with player i, since f < c < b. We now get
players in A(s) to move and they all form a link with player i, since f < c < b < d. It may
be checked that we have reached an equilibrium state s
0
, with A(s
0
)  A(s) + 1.
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Consider now the second possibility. Pick a player j 2 B(s)nfig, who wishes to switch
actions from  to . It follows that this player will delete all her links with players in B(s)
and form links with all players in A(s) (since e < f < c < b < d). We then examine the
incentives of the players still choosing action , i.e., players in the set B(s)nfi; jg. If there
are no players who would like to switch actions then we repeat step above and arrive at a
new state with a larger -component. If there are players who wish to switch actions from
 to  then we get them to move one at a time. Eventually, we arrive at either a new state
s
0
2 S

, or we arrive at a state s
0
2 S

.
In either case, we have shown that starting from a state s 2 S

, we can move with a single
mutation to a state s
0
such that A(s
0
)  A(s)+1. Since s 2 S

was arbitrary, the proof is
complete for the rst part. The second conclusion concerning some new equilibrium state
s
00
with j A(s
00
) jj A(s) j  1 is analogous. 2
7 Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 4.1: We rst show that a
i
= a
j
, if i and j belong to the same
component. Suppose not and let a
i
=  while a
j
= . Let there be k players in this
component with k

players choosing action  and k

(= k   k

) players choosing action
. The payo to player i from action  is given by (k

  1)d + k

e   l
i
c, where l
i
is the
number of links formed by i. If, instead, player i were to choose action  (keeping her
links), the payo would be (k

  1)f + k

b   l
i
c. Since, in equilibrium, player i prefers
action  it follows that (k

  1)(d  f)  k

(b  e). Similar calculations show that since,
in equilibrium, player j prefers action  it must be true that (k

  1)(b  e)  k

(d  f).
Given that d > f and b > e, this generates a contradiction.
We next show that if an equilibrium network is non-empty then there is only one com-
ponent, i.e. the network is connected. Fix some equilibrium and suppose that g is the
corresponding (non-empty) network, with g
0
being a non-singleton component in g. Sup-
pose, without loss of generality, that a
i
=  for every i 2 g
0
. Consider now some g
00
6= g
0
and assume a
j
=  for every player j 2 g
00
. Let k
0
and k
00
be the cardinality of the two
components, g
0
and g
00
respectively. Consider now any particular player i 2 g
0
who forms
some links l
i
> 0 in g
0
and let (k
0
 1)d  l
i
c be her payo. Since g is part of an equilibrium,
it follows that (k
0
  1)d   l
i
c  k
00
b   c. On the other hand, let (k
00
  1)b   l
j
c be the
payo to some player j 2 g
00
, where l
j
is the number of links that she forms. It follows
from the denition of equilibrium that (k
00
  1)b  l
j
c  k
0
d  c. Bringing the former two
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inequalities together we reach a contradiction. The argument is analogous in case a
j
= .
This proves that a non-empty equilibrium network is connected. The minimality of the
equilibrium network follows from the assumption that c > 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.2: From Proposition 4.1, we know that an equilibrium network is
either empty or minimally connected. Consider a minimally connected equilibrium network
g. Suppose that player i has a link with player j in this network, i.e. g
i;j
= 1. We show
that in a strict Nash equilibrium, this implies that player j does not have a link with any
other player, i.e., g
j;k
= 0 for all k 6= i. Suppose there is some player k such that g
j;k
= 1.
In this case, individual i can simply interchange her link with j for a link with k and get
the same payos. Thus, the strategy of forming a link with j is not a strict best response.
Hence g is not a strict Nash network. The above argument also implies that, since g is
connected, player i must be linked to every other player directly. The resulting network is
therefore a star. Moreover, it also follows that this link must be formed by player i herself.
For otherwise, if there is a player k such that g
k;i
= 1; then this player is again indierent
between the link with i and some other agent in the star. This implies that the star must
be center-sponsored and completes the proof. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.3: First, consider case (a). We know from Proposition 4.1 that
every player in a component chooses the same action. We also know that there are only
two possible equilibrium architectures, g 2 G
cs
and g
e
. Clearly, the empty network cannot
be part of a strict Nash equilibrium (see also arguments for part (c) below). Thus the
only candidates for strict Nash equilibrium are s 2 G
cs
 f(; ; :::; )g or s 2 G
cs

f(; ; :::; )g. It is easily checked that any of those are indeed strict Nash equilibria.
Consider case (b) next. Again, the empty network is not sustainable by a strict Nash equi-
librium. Then the only candidates are s 2 G
cs
f(; ; :::; )g or s 2 G
cs
f(; ; :::; )g.
It is immediate to see that none of the latter is sustainable as an equilibrium since c > b,
which implies that the central player does not have an incentive to form a link with iso-
lated players. Thus the only remaining candidates are the former states, which are easily
checked to be strict Nash equilibria.
Finally, consider case (c). If c > d; then the center-sponsored star cannot be an equilibrium
network. Thus, the only candidate for a strict equilibrium network is the empty one.
However, if a network is empty, the choice of actions is irrelevant. This means that there
is no strict Nash equilibrium in this case. The proof is complete. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.1: Let s

and s

be generic states in
~
S

and
~
S

; respectively.
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Step 1: First, we focus on the transitions from s

and s

. Fix some network g and choose
a player i 2 N . Consider the network g   g
i
derived from g by the deletion of all of
player i's links. Suppose that this latter network has L components, C
1
; C
2
; :::; C
L
; with
C
1
corresponding to the component of player i. Furthermore, denote by x(h) the total
number of players in C
1
who choose action h = ; . Similarly, let y(h) stand for the
total number of players in NnC
1
= [
L
l=2
C
l
who choose action h = ;  in s

: Suppose that
player i is given a revision opportunity. With the above notation in hand, we may write
her maximum payo from choosing  as follows:


= x()d+ x()e+ y()d+ y()e  (L  1)c; (28)
where we use the fact that c < e and, therefore, player i must nd it optimal to link to all
components. On the other hand, the maximum payo to choosing  is given by:


= x()f + x()b + y()f + y()b  (L  1)c: (29)
To initiate a transition towards s

; we must have that player i prefers action . This may
be written as follows:


  

= (x() + y())(d  f)  (x() + y())(b  e) > 0: (30)
We are interested in a network structure which requires the minimum number of players
who are choosing . Let x() + y() = k and, therefore, x() + y() = n   k   1.
From the above expression it follows that the minimum value of k for which (30) holds is
insensitive to the particular network structure and only depends on the number of players
choosing dierent actions. From (30)we can also infer that the minimum number ~m
;
of
simultaneous mutations required to move from any s

2
~
S

to some state s

2
~
S

is given
by :
~m
;

b  e
(d  f) + (b  e)
(n  1): (31)
From the above discussion it also follows that the payo comparisons are insensitive to the
precise distribution of active and passive links. This implies also that any the number of
mutations identied in (31) is suÆcient to trigger the desired transition.
Step 2: Consider, on the other hand, the transition from s

to s

: Using again the expres-
sions (28) and (29), we can deduce that the minimum number of mutations required (also
suÆcient) is given by:
~m
;

d  f
(d  f) + (b  e)
(n  1): (32)
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Combining (31) and (32), the desired conclusion follows. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.2: First, we extend former notation. Let g be some arbitrarily given
network and i 2 N a given player in the population. Again, we focus on the network
g  g
i
derived from g by the deletion of all of player i's links, and let C
1
be the component
of player i in g   g
i
, denoting by x(h) the number of players who choose action h in
C
1
. Now, however, it is useful to classify the remaining L  1 components, C
2
; C
3
; :::; C
L
;
into dierent categories depending on the mix of actions they display. Specically, let C
h
l
,
h = ; , stand for a generic -component in network g g
i
(i.e. a component in which every
player chooses action h) and, similarly, let C

l
refer to component in which some players
choose  while others choose . These components C
h
l
are indexed by l = 1; 2; :::; L
h
, where
h = ; ; . (Note that L

+L

+L

= L  1:) Furthermore, for each these components
C
h
l
, the number of players choosing action h
0
(h
0
= ; ) is denoted by y
h
l
(h
0
) { hence, for
example, y

l
() = 0 for all l: Finally, we aggregate across dierent components and make
y
h
(h
0
) 
P
l=1;2;:::;L
h
y
h
l
(h
0
) and y(h
0
)  y
h
0
(h
0
) + y

(h
0
)
Let s

and s

be generic states in
~
S

and
~
S

; respectively.
Step 1: We start with transitions from s

to s

. Fix some network g and suppose player
i receives an opportunity to revise her strategy. Then note that, since we assume that
c > e; there exists some number z  2 such that (z   1)e < c  ze and, therefore, if
player i chooses action ; she will not form any links with components C

l
6= C
1
whose
cardinality


C

l


 < z: This motivates dividing the set of C

l
components into two groups,
small and large, depending on whether their cardinality is above or below the number z:
We index the small C

l
components from 1 to

L

, while the large components are indexed
from

L

+ 1 to

L

+
^
L

(= L

). Furthermore, we dene y

() =
P
l=1;:::;

L

y

l
() and
y^

() =
P
l=

L

+1;:::;L

y

l
(). With this notation in place, the payo to player i of choosing
 may be written as follows:


= x()d+ x()e + [y

() + y

()]d+ [y

() + y^

()]e  [L

+ L

+
^
L

]c: (33)
On the other hand, the payo from choosing  is equal to:


= x()f+x()b+[y

()+y

()]f +[y

()+ y^

()+ y

()]b  [L

+L

+
^
L

+

L

]c:
(34)
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To initiate the transition towards s

; player i must prefer action  to ; i.e. 

  

> 0.
Using (33)-(34) and setting k = x() + y

() + y

(), this inequality can be rewritten as
follows:
k(d  f)  x()(b  e)  [y

() + y^

()](b  e)  [y

()b 

L

c] > 0: (35)
As before we wish to minimize the value of k, conceived as the number of simultaneous
mutations towards action  that perturb the state s

: This in turn means that we aim at
minimizing the value of the negative terms in (35). We begin by noting that, for a xed
value of y

(), the value of the term [y

()b  

L

c] is minimized when

L

= y

(), i.e.
when each of the small components is a singleton. This allows us to rewrite (35) as follows:
k(d  f)  x()(b  e)  [y

() + y^

()](b  e)  y

()[b  c] > 0: (36)
We next note that for any xed value of x() + y

() + y^

() + y

(), the value of k is
minimized when we set the number x()+y

()+ y^

() = 0; i.e. when y

() = n k 1.
This follows from the fact that b  e > b  c. Combining these observations, we nd that
the minimum number of mutations ~m
;
required for the contemplated transition must
satisfy:
~m
;

b  c
(d  f) + (b  c)
(n  1): (37)
We now show that a number of mutations satisfying the above inequality is also suÆcient,
if those mutations are appropriately chosen. Recall that s

2
~
S

is a center-sponsored
star. Let player n be the center of the star and suppose that the following simultaneous
mutations occur. On the one hand, ~m
;
  1 players at the spokes switch their action from
 to . On the other hand, player n's strategy also undergoes a mutation: she switches to
 and retains her links with the ~m
;
  1 players who have switched actions but deletes all
her links with the remaining n  ~m
;
players (who are still playing action ). This pattern
of ~m
;
mutations results in a network where the players choosing action  form a center-
sponsored star, while all the players choosing  are rendered as singleton components.
If these players are then picked for a revision opportunity, the computations leading to
(37) imply that they will all choose action  and become linked to the -component.
Subsequently, by Proposition 4.4, the unperturbed dynamics alone is enough to lead the
process a.s. to a center-sponsored star with everyone choosing action . Thus, in sum,
we conclude that ~m
;
mutations satisfying (37) are suÆcient for a transition from any
s

2
~
S

to some s

2
~
S

.
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Step 2: Consider next the transition from s

to s

. Here, we would like to induce the
particular player i who receives a revision opportunity to choose : Again, her payos


and 

from choosing either action are given by (33) and (34). Thus, the required
inequality 

  

> 0 can be rewritten as follows:
 [x()+y

()+y

()](d f)+[x()+y

()+ y^

()](b e)+[y

()b 

L

c] > 0: (38)
Let k = x()+y

()+y^

()+y

(). We wish to minimize the value of k. This, on the one
hand, amounts to the minimization of the rst negative term in (38). But since the value
of [x() + y

() + y

()] = n   k   1 is insensitive to the precise links of the -players,
their specic distribution across the dierent components is irrelevant. We can therefore
simplify by setting x() = y

() = 0. Next, we take up the other terms, for which we
must identify the \best distribution" of the -players leading to a minimum k in (38).
First, we focus on the number

L

of small -components. Since only if player i chooses
 will she link to any of these components, the net payo gain she would enjoy through
each of them by choosing  rather than  is rb   c; where r stands for the cardinality
of the (small) component in question. On the other hand, if those r players were instead
part of a large component, player i would link to them both if she plans to play  or :
Consequently, the net gain obtained through them by choosing  rather than  would be
r(b   e). Combining both considerations, we nd that the dierence between these net
gains (corresponding to the alternative possibilities that the r players under consideration
belong to either a small or a large -component) is re  c: Since, by denition, r  z   1
and (z 1)e < c; we conclude that the latter dierence is negative and therefore the desired
distribution of -players involves no small components, i.e.

L

= 0. Introducing this fact
in (38), the minimum number of mutations ~m
;
can be shown to satisfy:
~m
;

d  f
(d  f) + (b  e)
(n  1): (39)
Finally, we argue that this number of mutations is also suÆcient for the transition. Suppose
that, starting from s

(whose associated network is a center-sponsored star), there is a
simultaneous mutation in the strategy of ~m
;
players whereby they switch their action
from  to  without altering their links. Since, in particular, the central player retains
her links, those mutations result in a network where all players are still connected through
a center-sponsored star. Thus, if players who are still playing action  are subsequently
provided with a revision opportunity, the computations leading to (39) imply that they
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will choose action . Thereafter, by Proposition 4.4, the unperturbed dynamics will lead
the system to a center-sponsored star with everyone choosing action , i.e. a state in
~
S

,
with probability 1. In sum, therefore, we conrm that ~m
;
mutations are suÆcient for a
transition from any state s

2
~
S

to some state s

2
~
S

. 2
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